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INTRODUCTION 
Gibrat’s law, which predicts that the organic (or internal) growth rates of firms are independent 
of their size, is one of the most important axioms in the industrial economics literature and one that has 
been subject to several prior empirical tests for a good summary of prior contemporary empirical tests 
of Gibrat’s Law.1 In an historical analysis of innovation in the United States (US) automobile industry 
between 1900 and 1930, and the personal computer industry of the last 25 years of the twentieth 
century Mazzacuto finds that Gibrat’s Law is a good approximation of the independence of firm size-
growth patterns particularly in the early phase of product-market and technological development.2 
Therefore, overall conclusion arising from most of the prior research is that self-generated corporate 
growth rates tend to vary randomly across firms and over time, as predicted by Gibrat’s Law of 
Proportionate Effects.3 In other words, growth is independent of firm size in single and multi-period 
states. However, as Audretsch, Klomp, Santorelli and Thurik report, only few tests of Gibrat’s Law have 
been carried out in the financial services sector.4 Indeed, only two prior tests of Gibrat’s Law have been 
conducted on insurance markets using contemporaneous data sets: Hardwick and Adams on the United 
Kingdom (UK) life insurance market and Choi on the US property-liability insurance market.5  
A’Hearn examined the historical relation between profitability and organic rates of growth 
amongst Italian banks between 1890 and 1910. A’Hearn found inconsistency with the predictions of 
Gibrat’s Law in that banks in Southern Italy achieved slower rates of growth than their counterparts in 
the North of the country which he attributed to regional variations in information asymmetries and 
principal-agent problems.6 However, to the best of our knowledge, no prior tests of Gibrat’s Law in the 
early growth and development of insurance markets have been conducted in the economic history 
literature. This is surprising as insurance markets in Europe and North America have long been 
associated with dynamic rates of firm growth, increasing levels of market competition (e.g., from new 
entrants), and new product-market developments since the early days of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Indeed, insurers in the early industrialized economies were amongst the first companies to 
expand their markets nationally and internationally.7 In theory mutual forms of organization emerged in 
insurance markets to mitigate information asymmetries and principal-agent incentive conflicts and that 
this economic advantage allowed them to operate successfully and survive alongside stock forms of 
organization.8 Indeed, since the late eighteenth/early nineteenth centuries Sweden’s insurance market 
has been characterized by large numbers of small locally-based insurance mutual operating alongside 
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larger national stock forms of organization.9 Accordingly, an historical analysis of Gibrat’s law in 
Sweden’s life insurance market could usefully inform economic historians as to whether or not different 
organizational forms were able to more effectively manage market imperfections (e.g., information 
asymmetries and agency costs) to realize better rates of growth over time.  
Moreover, utilizing historical time-series and cross-sectional data should help provide clearer 
insights into the linkage between past performance and firm growth in global insurance markets, which 
is currently one of the largest but least understood industrial sectors in the world10. Indeed, Dunne, 
Roberts and Samuelson report that one of the greatest impediments to examining the relation between 
firm size and growth has been the lack of access to longitudinal data sets. The present study thus seeks 
to address this gap in the literature. Furthermore, the general question of whether small insurers grow 
as fast as (or faster than) large insurers is an issue of some importance to economic historians. For 
example, insights into the relation between self-generated corporate growth and firm size could help 
scholars to better understand the general structure and evolution of financial markets and institutions 
over time – for example, in terms of regulatory developments (e.g., the licensing of new entrants), the 
motives for national and global expansion, and the associated growth of insurance industry-specific 
ancillary and professional services (e.g., brokers and actuaries).  
We thus seek to address the dearth of economic historical research on the development of 
insurance markets using 1855-1947 data from the Swedish life insurance market to test Gibrat’s Law 
and, more generally, to investigate the determinants of the growth of insurance firms.11 To conduct the 
study, we apply recently-developed panel unit root tests and panel Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) regression analysis rather than relying on more traditional tests based on cross-sectional data. 
 The institutional setting for our research – Sweden – is advantageous as in the period covered 
by our analysis (1855-1947) most Swedish insurance firms grew organically rather than from mergers 
and acquisitions. After World War II, merger and acquisition activity in the Swedish insurance market 
became more common as a result of technological progress and regulatory encouragement.12 This 
means that our analysis largely avoids the potentially confounding effects of non-organic growth: this 
should enable us to conduct potentially cleaner tests of our research hypotheses. Furthermore, we 
focus on life insurance as this was one of the largest lines in the insurance industry during our period of 
analysis.13 What is more, the years 1855 to 1947 were ones where a ‘deep and efficient’ in Sweden 
either did not exist (as pre-1903 Insurance Act) and/or it was a period when the investment decisions of 
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insurance managers were constrained by precautionary investment rules.14 This means that during the 
period of our data analysis the organic growth rates of Swedish insurance firms was largely a function of 
their underwriting activities and not unduly distorted by the effects of major cyclical movements in 
stock market prices on the value of  their investment portfolios.  
THE EMERGENCE OF SWEDEN’S LIFE INSURANCE MARKET  
Between 1830 and 1870 Sweden underwent considerable industrial and commercial 
development and increased capital investment and growth in real incomes. This national economic 
development witnessed the establishment and growth of the financial sector including insurance as well 
as banking services.15 Economic and development specifically increased the demand for life insurance 
amongst all social classes in Sweden during the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries.16 The first 
insurance companies to enter the Swedish market were domestic and foreign joint-stock companies. 
The first company (Skandia, 1855) was organized as a joint-stock composite (property and life 
insurance) company. A composite structure was also adopted by two other prominent life offices in the 
second half of the nineteenth century (Svea, 1866 and Skåne, 1884). However, most new entrants to 
the Swedish life insurance market at this time were specialist life insurance carriers.17 At the turn of the 
twentieth century, about 40 domestic and foreign life insurance companies operated in Sweden though 
the market share of foreign life insurers declined from 10% of gross premiums at the late nineteenth 
century to less than 1% of gross premiums after 1920.  However, over this period small mutual life 
offices increased their share of the market, particularly in terms of industrial life insurance policies for 
working class households, from 8% of gross premiums in 1890 to roughly 40% of gross premiums in the 
run-up to World War I and rising steadily during the interwar and post-World War II years to roughly 
70% of gross premiums by 1950. However, a degree of consolidation took place in the domestic life 
insurance market during the interwar years such that by the end of World War II only about 30 life 
offices operated in the Swedish life insurance market.18 
Sweden’s insurance market was largely unregulated during in the nineteenth century. However, 
from around 1870 the market was characterized by close cooperation amongst the larger, mainly joint-
stock, companies on matters such as premium rating, financial publicity and principles for reserving.19 
The Insurance Act (1903) formalized solvency standards, introduced new actuarial and financial 
disclosure rules, and instigated a system of statutory solvency monitoring through an industrial 
regulatory agency - the National Private Insurance Inspectorate. This new institutional framework 
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remained almost unchanged up to the passing of the Insurance Act (1948) after World War II.20 This 
meant that from 1903 to 1947 Sweden’s life insurance market was governed by a fairly homogeneous 
and consistent institutional framework.  
 
GIBRAT’S LAW 
 Gibrat’s Law holds that skewness in populations (such as those relating to size frequencies) 
reflects an underpinning Gaussian process - according to which a large number of small but 
independent additive influences generate a normal distribution. Thus, an observed skewed distribution 
of variate x could be modelled by positing that an underlying function of x (say, the natural logarithm of 
x) is normally distributed.21 Applying this stochastic model to cross-sectional/time-series firm-based 
data from the French manufacturing sector, Gibrat demonstrated empirically that proportionate organic 
(asset-based) growth was independent of firm size.22 A basic tenet of Gibrat’s Law is that firms face the 
same probability distribution of self-generated growth rates, with each firm’s observed growth pattern 
determined by a random sampling from that distribution.23 In its basic form, the stochastic process can 
be expressed as: 
          [1] 
where (SIZE)it is the size of  firm i at time t and (SIZE)i,t-1 is the size of firm i in some previous time period; 
it is a disturbance term that is assumed to have a mean equal to one and a constant variance. The value 
of  may be interpreted as the constant market rate of growth, while the value of 1 represents the 
effect of initial size on the subsequent rate of firms’ growth. If 1 = 1, firm growth is independent of 
initial size and Gibrat’s Law holds (assuming that the disturbances, it, are independently distributed 
over time.24 If 1 > 1, large firms tend to grow faster than smaller firms, and if 1 < 1, small firms tend to 
grow faster than larger firms. The functional form in [1] thus takes into account the dynamic relation 
between current period changes in firm size and recent past changes in firm size. Taking natural 
logarithms, the basic stochastic process may be re-written as:  
  ln SIZEit = 0   +  1 ln SIZEi,t – 1  +  it    [2] 
where 0  = ln  and it  = ln it.  
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 Prior empirical studies have also tested the sensitivity of the Gibrat process to various firm-
specific influences, such as the cost of capital and labor, and other variables, such as profitability, in 
order to improve understanding of the determinants of firm growth.25 The reasoning is that such factors 
directly influence the output choices of managers in firms and thus may be important determinants of 
corporate growth rates and the structural evolution of markets. In this study, therefore, we also 
consider the relative influence of a number of firm-specific factors in the growth of Swedish life 
insurance firms. These factors are input costs, profitability, age, organizational form and reinsurance. 
The motivation for including firm-specific variables in the present study, as well as a set of 
macroeconomic and regulatory control variables, is explained below.  
Input costs 
Insurance firms can have higher-than-average input costs per unit of output (i.e., be relatively 
cost inefficient) for a number of reasons. For example, the concept of cost inefficiency can refer either 
to unexploited economies of scale or diseconomies of scale in an industry, or to the existence of 
technical or allocative inefficiency. An insurance firm with unexploited economies of scale could reduce 
average cost by increasing the scale of its operations, but doing so may be difficult as scale inefficiency 
puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage that may hinder growth. Similarly, an insurer facing 
diseconomies of scale could reduce average costs by contracting the scale of its operations.26 Thus, 
while the existence of economies of scale provides a clear incentive for the organic and acquisition-
based growth of firms, such growth may be difficult to achieve – for example, due to agency incentive 
conflicts in insurance firms (e.g., managerial inertia and the misuse of corporate resources on perquisite 
consumption).27 Moreover, diseconomies of scale could provide an incentive for contraction or at least 
represent a barrier to any further growth.28 
Previous research from contemporary insurance markets such as the US and UK suggests that 
many insurers with unexploited economies of scale have operated for many years without going out of 
business or being the subject of corporate takeover.29 One possible explanation, alluded to by Fields, is 
that insurance markets have not been sufficiently competitive and that absent price transparency plus a 
lack of knowledge about policy conditions and premiums on the part of consumers (i.e., asymmetric 
information) have allowed such scale-inefficient firms (and their management structures) to survive.30 
In the economic and business history literature, Westall also emphasizes the importance of information 
asymmetry and intrinsic transaction and agency costs in explaining the continuity of inefficient 
 6  
organizational structures in the UK non-life insurance market in the nineteenth century.31 Technical and 
allocative cost inefficiencies refer to the deviation of a firm’s actual cost of production from the 
minimum cost achievable by that size of firm due to inefficient resource allocation.32 Thus, insurance 
firms that are cost inefficient could either produce more output with the same quantity and 
combination of inputs or could produce the same output with lower input quantities and therefore a 
lower cost of production.33  
The most likely relation between input costs and firm growth is difficult to determine. If higher 
costs are caused mainly by the existence if economies of scale in the insurance industry, we would 
expect higher-cost insurers to grow faster as they seek to take advantage of the available economies of 
scale. However, if higher costs are caused mainly by diseconomies of scale or technical and allocative 
inefficiencies, then we would expect insurance firms with higher input costs per unit of output to 
perform less well than more cost-efficient firms and so grow more slowly.34 In our empirical study, we 
measure ‘input costs per unit of output’ for a life insurance company as total operating expenses 
divided by gross premium income. 
 
Profitability 
Geroski contend that, although firm growth and size may approximately follow a random 
distribution over time, profitability could nonetheless be an important determinant of corporate growth 
and development.35 Sustained profitability over time could enable insurance firms to accumulate 
reserves and realize positive net present value investment opportunities while concomitantly avoiding 
the high costs of raising external finance.36 On the other hand, there could be an inverse relation 
between profitability and firm size/growth as year-on-year profits could accentuate agency problems in 
insurance firms by motivating managers to misuse free cash flows, for example, on excessive perquisite 
consumption rather than investing in profitable growth opportunities.37 In fact, the empirical evidence 
of the linkage between profitability and the size and growth rates of firms is ambiguous. With regard to 
the contemporary US life insurance industry, Santomero and Babbel observe that managers may not 
accurately predict the timing and impact of severe economic shocks (e.g., adverse interest rate 
movements) and that this could adversely affect both the level of corporate profitability and the pace of 
product-market development.38 This observation suggests that, consistent with Gibrat’s Law, if future 
economic shocks are largely unpredictable, corporate growth rates in the insurance industry are also 
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likely to be unpredictable. Indeed, such a priori reasoning is supported by the recent empirical evidence 
from contemporary insurance markets in the UK and US.39  In our empirical study, we measure a life 
insurer’s profitability as total annual net profit divided by gross premium income. 
Company Age 
 Jovanovic predicts that successful firms become more efficient over time while less efficient 
firms exit the market at an early stage.40 This means that older firms are more likely to survive in 
markets compared with younger firms but that surviving younger firms will tend to grow at a faster rate 
than more established operatives. Therefore, Jovanovic’s analysis suggests an inverse relation between 
the age of a firm and its size/growth.  Indeed, empirical evidence from the contemporary US property-
liability insurance market cited in Choi supports this prediction, and so we also expect a negative 
relation between firm age and firm size/growth.41 In the present study, the age of the life insurance firm 
is taken from the year that it was licensed to transact insurance business in Sweden. 
Organizational Form 
 Corporate growth rates in insurance markets could also be influenced by whether an insurer is a 
policyholder-owned mutual form of organization or a stock company owned by shareholders.42 Our 
reasoning here is simply that organic growth rates are likely to be influenced by the availability of 
capital and thus more likely to favor the stock form of organization which has access to the capital 
markets. In contrast, mutual insurers are unlikely to have such easy access to funds to aid organic 
growth.43 We therefore expect mutual insurers to exhibit higher rates of growth than mutual insurers. 
On the other hand, mutual life insurers held relatively smaller reserves, and thus incurred lower capital 
costs than their stock life insurance company counterparts. As noted earlier, during the period of our 
analysis (1855 -1947) mutual life offices were also successful in targeting the growing mass-market 
amongst the working classes for industrial life insurance products. While the early stock companies 
business model was adapted from the mid-nineteenth century market to target the life insurance and 
other financial needs of the upper and middle class, their ability to supply cost-effective but profitable 
policies for the working classes was limited relative to their mutual insurance competitors.44 In our 
empirical study, we measure organizational form by a dummy variable, set equal to 0 for mutual 
companies and 1 for stock companies. 
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Reinsurance 
 Abdul Kader, Adams, Andersson and Lindmark report that reinsurance was a major factor in 
enabling non-life insurance firms in Sweden to mitigate their risk exposure (enhance solvency) and 
increase their underwriting capacity, particularly during the turbulent macro-economic times of the 
inter-war years.45 Therefore, the ability of insurance firms to improve their solvency position and 
underwriting capacity by reinsuring (transferring) assumed risks enables them to reduce their costs of 
capital, lower premiums, and so realize corporate growth through increased market share. On the other 
hand, Doherty and Smetters argue that the frictional costs of reinsurance could lead to increased 
premiums and so stifle the pace of corporate growth. Indeed, recent empirical evidence from the US 
property insurance market supports an inverse relation between reinsurance and firm growth.46 Abdul 
Kader et al. measure reinsurance as the ratio of the annual amount of reinsurance premiums ceded to 
gross annual premiums written.47 
  Macro-economic and regulatory control variables 
 Adams, Andersson, Lindmark and Veprauskaite contend that macro-economic and regulatory 
effects can influence the growth and development of insurance firms. For example, changes in annual 
rates of inflation and interest can affect the value of assets and liabilities held on the balance sheets, 
and could result in cross-temporal variations in the ability of insurers to grow their business.48 Indeed, 
Adams et al. point out that between 1903 and 1939 high (low) interest rates increased (reduced) bond 
yields for Swedish property fire insurers thus influencing the level of premiums that could be charged in 
the market and hence the rate of firm growth. Also, changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) affect the 
level of disposable incomes and the propensity of commercial and household consumers to buy 
insurance products. Abdul Kader et al. note that macro-economic effects during the inter-war years had 
a particularly severe impact on solvency levels and rates of new business growth in Sweden’s property 
fire insurance market – a situation that fostered the growth of reinsurance protection.49 From his 
analysis of the historical development of the US life insurance industry, Zanjani notes that regulatory 
developments, such as enhanced licensing and capital maintenance requirements, can impact on the 
ability of insurers to realize profitable growth.50 Lindmark et al. point out that the new capital and 
reserving, and other (e.g., licensing) requirements of the Insurance Act (1903) had important 
consequences for the financial and operational management of Swedish insurers.51 In the present study 
the real rate of interest is represented by the average five-year government bond yield (as insurers 
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rarely held short-term bonds during the period of our analysis) minus the annual rate of inflation 
(measured as the average annual change in the consumer price index) and real GDP is taken as a 
measure of aggregate demand in the economy. Regulatory effects are represented using a dummy 
variable set equal to 1 for the period before 1903 (during which there was relatively weak insurance 
regulation and inspection in Sweden) and 0 for the period 1903 onwards (during which there was 
insurance regulation and inspection as specified in the Insurance Act (1903). 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Samples and Data 
The insurance firms included in our sample can be categorized into three main types: 
independent stock companies; independent mutual companies; and subsidiaries of stock or mutual 
organizations. How to deal with the last group is a problem for a study of this kind. These are firms that 
retain their names and authorities to operate as insurers; however, they operate in many respects 
independently of their parent companies, yet are owned by the shareholders of the parent companies 
and ultimately controlled by the parent companies’ board of directors. When independent insurers are 
taken over by a larger group but continue to operate as before, should the companies be regarded as 
survivors or non-survivors? In this empirical study we follow previous research and treat such firms as 
survivors if they continue to report as separate entities under their former corporate names.52 The 
years 1855 to 1947 cover the period during which life insurers in Sweden (particularly stock companies) 
expanded the scale of their business operations primarily by means of organic growth. After this period, 
regulatory-induced market consolidation became more common in the industry following the passing of 
the 1948 Insurance Act.53  
The 38 insurance firms in our sample operated over widely different time periods, giving us an 
unbalanced panel of 1,237 firm-year observations. The average number of years of data per insurance 
firm in the sample is 32.6, the longest series being 92 years and the shortest being just 2 years. The 
inclusion in the sample of both surviving and non-surviving Swedish life insurance companies in such an 
extremely unbalanced panel should help to mitigate any possible problems arising from survivorship 
bias resulting from sample attrition. The empirical study is divided into two parts. In the first part, we 
employ ‘panel unit root’ tests of Gibrat’s Law for the period 1855-1947 and the two sub-periods 1855-
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1902 (prior to the Insurance Act 1903) and 1903-1947 (after the Insurance Act 1903 but prior to the 
Insurance Act 1948). By focusing the analysis on these two sub-periods, we can test whether the 
historical firm size-growth relation in Sweden’s life insurance market was influenced by changes in 
regulatory and macro-economic conditions. In the second part of the empirical study, we employ 
dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regression analysis to examine other possible 
determinants of the growth of life insurance firms, as discussed in the second section of our paper, also 
for the period 1855-1947 and the two sub-periods. In both parts of the study, firm size is measured in 
terms of total assets (deflated by the GDP deflator) and firm growth is measured as the annual rate of 
change of total assets. Some previous researchers have argued that annual growth may be too ‘noisy’ 
and so have recommended that firm growth should be measured over longer periods than a single year. 
As a robustness check of our regression results, therefore, we also measure growth over two-year and 
three-year periods. The results were essentially unchanged. 
The variables included in both parts of the study are measured according to the definitions 
given in Table 1. Data on firm sizes, input costs, profitability, company age, organizational form and 
reinsurance were obtained from the Official Statistics on insurance.54 Data on real interest rates, GDP 
and the GDP deflator were extracted from secondary sources.55 Table 1 also summarizes the full set of 
hypotheses to be tested. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
Panel Units Root Tests of Gibrat’s Law 
Many earlier contemporaneous studies of Gibrat’s Law have used cross-sectional data to 
compare the growth rates of a sample of companies over a selected time period (usually one year or 
more) with the companies’ sizes at the start of the period. For example, Hardwick and Adams used a 
cross-section of UK life insurance firms over the period 1987-96 and three sub-periods (1987-90, 1990-
93 and 1993-96) to test Gibrat’s Law by regressing the natural logarithm of firm growth over each 
period on the natural logarithm of firm size at the beginning of each period.56 The method of weighted 
least squares was applied to deal with heteroscedastic errors and a Heckman two-stage procedure was 
employed to address the potential problem of survivorship bias in the estimation.57 The results provided 
broad support for Gibrat’s Law in the context of the UK life insurance industry. Studies that have used 
similar cross-sectional methods include Dunne and Hughes and Hart and Oulton.58 More recent 
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developments in the analysis of panel data have opened up the possibility of testing Gibrat’s Law using 
pooled or panel data, rather than cross-sectional data. A general panel data formulation of equation [2] 
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where i  and t  represent individual firm and time effects respectively, ij  represents the coefficients 
on p lagged growth terms (included to control for possible serial correlation arising from growth 
persistence) and 1i  is the size coefficient for firm i. In this formulation, values of β greater than 1 
would imply that larger insurance firms grow faster than smaller insurance firms. Goddard, Wilson and 
Blandon (2002) point out that, while ‘explosive’ growth of this type may be possible over short periods, 
it is unlikely that it could continue over a long period. Values of β less than 1 would imply that smaller 
firms grow faster than larger firms. And if β = 1 we can conclude that firm growth is independent of firm 
size. Thus, if we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that β = 1, we can conclude that the sample 
data provide support for Gibrat’s law. Recent applications of panel unit root tests of Gibrat’s Law 
include Goddard et al and Oliveira and Fortunato.59 
 For our sample of Swedish life insurers, we conduct two panel unit root tests. The first test was 
developed by Levin, Lin and Chu, hereafter referred to as the LLC test, and the second was developed by 
Im, Pesaran and Shin, hereafter referred to as the IPS test.60 The main difference between the two tests 
relates to the firm size coefficient ( i ). The LLC test assumes that the size coefficient remains constant 
across cross-sections, so that  i  for all i. So if we exclude the unlikely possibility of explosive 
growth, in the LLC formulation, the null and alternative hypotheses may be written as: H0: β = 1, H1: β < 
1. The IPS test, on the other hand, allows i  to vary across cross-sections, so that in this case the null 
and alternative hypotheses may be written as: H0: βi = 1 for all i, H1: βi < 1 for some i. 
 The results of the LLC and IPS panel unit root tests are summarized in Table 2. Both tests were 
first conducted for the entire sample of 1,237 firm-year observations over the period 1855 to 1947, and 
both tests allow us to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. For the entire period, therefore, our 
results do not support Gibrat’s law, but instead suggest that smaller firms have tended to grow faster 
than larger firms in the Swedish life insurance industry. Table 2 also shows the more mixed results 
obtained when the two tests are applied to the two sub-samples consisting of 270 firm-year 
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observations over the period 1855-1902 and 967 firm-year observations over the period 1903-47. The 
LLC and IPS tests both allow us to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for the later sub-period, but 
not for the earlier sub-period. Overall, however, the panel unit root tests offer some support for the 
view that that smaller insurers in Sweden experienced a long-run tendency to grow faster than larger 
insurers during the period from 1855 to 1947. Our unit root tests are also consistent with Mazzucato’s 
view that Gibrat’s law is a good approximation of firms’ growth patterns during periods of technological 
change and product-market innovation.61 
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Multivariate Analysis of the Determinants of Firm Growth  
We turn now to our investigation of the link between the growth of Swedish life insurance firms 
and the five firm-specific factors discussed in Section 2 (namely, input costs (IC), profitability (PR), 
company age (AGE), organizational form (ORG) and reinsurance (REINS)). We also control for changes in 
the real interest rate (INT), real gross domestic product (GDP) and the regulatory environment (REG). 
The panel growth model to be estimated may be written as: 
 
ln (SIZE)it  =  0    +  1 ln (SIZE)i,t – 1  +  2 (IC)it  + 3 (PR)it  +  4AGEit    
+  5ORGit   + 6 (REINS)it  + 7 (INT)t   +  8 ln (GDP)t     
+  9 (REG)t    +  it                [4] 
 
The sample means and standard deviations of asset sizes, input costs, profitability, company age, 
organizational form and reinsurance plus the real rate of interest and GDP are shown in the first part of 
Table 3 for the full period and the two sub-periods. The average asset size of the Swedish life insurance 
firms in our sample grew from an average of SK12.9 million in the period 1855-1902 to SK39.2 million in 
the period 1903-47. The average expense ratio varied from 0.21 in 1855-1902 to 0.26 in 1903-47. At the 
same time, the average profitability ratio rose from just 0.13 in 1855-1902 to 0.46 in 1903-47. It is clear 
from the standard deviations that there is a large degree of within sample variation in all these 
variables. The second part of Table 3 shows the Pearson coefficients of correlation for the independent 
variables included in the regression equation (except REG) for the full 92-year period. These are all less 
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than 0.64 in magnitude, so the possibility of inefficient estimates resulting from multicollinearity is very 
small. As a further check on the possibility of multicollinearity, variance-inflation factors (VIFs) were 
calculated for each independent variable for each period.62 None of these exceed 4.5 (and similar 
results were obtained for the two sub-periods), confirming that problems associated with 
multicollinearity are unlikely in this model. 
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 Equation [4] was estimated separately for the full period and the two sub-periods and the 
results are shown in Table 4. The estimation was undertaken using panel GMM. GMM estimation is a 
form of ‘instrumental variable’ regression which mitigates the effects of correlation between the 
independent variables and the residual, such as that caused by heteroscedasticity and endogeneity 
among the explanatory variables. The GMM approach produces consistent and asymptotically efficient 
estimates and so is well suited to relatively large samples or panels. All of our independent variables are 
included in the regression for the entire period 1855-1947, but REG is (necessarily) omitted from the 
regression relating to the two sub-periods. All three regression equations have adjusted R2 values in 
excess of 0.9, indicating a good fit in all periods. 
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
We now consider the results in the light of the seven hypotheses listed in Table 1. 
Hypothesis H1: The estimate of 1 in the full-sample regression (1855-1947) is 0.970, which is 
significantly less than one at the 5% level. In the two sub-periods, the estimates are 0.949 in 1855-1902 
and 0.982 in 1903-1947, both significantly less than one at the 5% level. Taking these findings together 
with the results of the panel unit root tests above, we have evidence which supports the conclusion 
that (contrary to Gibrat’s Law) smaller firms had a tendency to grow faster than larger firms in the 
Swedish life insurance industry during the period 1855 to 1947. This could be the result of inherent 
inhibiting factors in large insurers (e.g., managerial inertia and excessive risk aversion) compared with 
the more innovative practices of small insurance firms. In fact, Westall makes similar observations from 
his historical analysis of the economic development of the UK’s non-life insurance market. We conclude 
that H1 is rejected.63  
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As a robustness check on these results, we repeated the GMM regression with firm growth 
measured over two- and three-year periods (rather than annually). With a two-year growth rate, the 
estimate of 1 was 0.817 and with a three-year growth rate the estimate was 0.740, both significantly 
less than one at the 5% level. There were no significant changes in the estimates of the other 
coefficients. 
Hypothesis H2:  The estimates of 2 (the coefficient on the input cost variable, IC) are mixed. 
Over the entire 92-year period and in the two sub-periods, the estimates of 2 are positive, but only 
significantly different from zero (at the 10% level) in the period 1855-1902. Overall, therefore, the 
evidence suggests a weak positive relation between firms’ growth rates and their input cost ratios. This 
lends some weight to the hypothesis that firms with higher costs because of unexploited economies of 
scale may grow faster as they attempt to benefit from the available economies. It is also possible that 
firms incurred higher costs as a result of offering greater financial inducements to staff and increased 
expenditure on training and marketing, both of which may have led to faster growth. Westall also notes 
that during the interwar years the lack of local market competition meant that large (oligopolistic) 
insurers in the UK could pass on the costs of business expansion (e.g., increased brokerage 
commissions) to policyholders in the form of higher premiums.64 A similar situation is likely to have 
occurred in Swedish non-life insurance market during our period of analysis. 
Hypothesis H3:  With regard to the importance of profitability as a predictor of Swedish life 
insurance firms’ asset growth, the estimate of 3 is positive and significant at the 5% level over the 
entire period (1855-1947). For the two sub-periods, the estimates are also positive but statistically 
insignificant. Overall, therefore, we find some evidence that firm growth and profitability in the Swedish 
life insurance industry were positively related between 1855 and 1947, which supports the view that 
higher levels of profitability could enable insurance firms to realize new investment opportunities and 
so encourage firm growth. This observation accords with firm growth patterns in the UK property fire 
insurance market during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.65  
Hypothesis H4:  The estimate of 4 (the coefficient on the company age variable) is positive but 
insignificant in the full sample. Interestingly, though, the estimated coefficient is positive and significant 
in the earlier sub-period, 1855-1902, during which there is evidence that older companies were growing 
faster than younger companies. This finding is consistent with the growth of large national stock 
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insurance firms in Sweden noted by Lindmark et al.66 In the later period, 1903-47, the estimate is 
insignificant. Overall, H4 is not supported by our results. 
Hypothesis H5: The estimate of 5 (the coefficient of organizational form) is negative and 
significant over the entire sample period, 1855-1947. For the two sub-periods, the estimates are also 
negative, though only significant in the earlier period, 1855-1902. These results support the view that 
mutual companies’ were more successful in targeting the growing life insurance market. This strategy 
was an important factor in determining growth potential. Hypothesis H5 is supported by our results. 
Hypothesis H6: The estimates of 6 (the coefficient for reinsurance) are positive and significant 
over the entire sample period and in the later sub-period, but the estimate is insignificant in the earlier 
sub-period. Overall, this finding lends some weight to the view reported in Abdul Kader et al. that 
reinsurance enables insurance firms to reduce their cost of capital and reduce their premiums, and so 
achieve higher annual growth.67 As a result, H6 is supported by our results. 
Hypothesis H7:  The estimates of 7 (the coefficient on the real interest rate variable) are 
positive and significant in all periods. Thus our results suggest that there is a positive link between 
variations in the real rate of interest in Sweden and the annual growth of life insurance firms. This 
observation is consistent with Waldenström who notes that from the early twentieth century the yields 
on the investment portfolios of Swedish institutional investors (such as insurers) became increasingly 
reliant on interest-bearing securities.68 Consequently, H7 is supported by our results. 
Hypothesis H8:  The estimate of 8 (the coefficient on real GDP) is positive and significant at the 
10% level over the entire period, but insignificant in the two sub-periods. This suggests a weak positive 
long-term link between the growth of life insurers and the Swedish economic cycle. Thus, our results 
provide some limited support for H8.  
Hypothesis H9:  The significantly positive estimate of 9 (the coefficient on REG) suggests that 
growth rates were higher in the period 1855-1903 when there was relatively little insurance regulation 
in Sweden. This finding lends weight to the view that tighter financial regulation and control can impede 
the growth of insurance firms.69 Therefore, H9 is supported by our results. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Using 1855-1947 data, this study tests empirically the predictions of Gibrat’s Law of 
Proportionate Effects in the Swedish life insurance industry and investigates the influences of a set of 
firm-specific and control variables on corporate growth. Our main conclusions can be summarized as 
follows.  
Taking the 92-year period as a whole and applying panel unit root tests and panel GMM 
regression, we have found a significant difference between the growth rates of small and large Swedish 
life insurance firms (with smaller firms tending to grow faster than larger firms), a result that clearly 
contradicts Gibrat’s Law as a long-run tendency in the Swedish life insurance sector. We have also found 
significant influences on firm growth from profitability, organizational form and reinsurance. The results 
for the two sub-periods in our sample are more mixed, except for the result that smaller firms tend to 
grow faster than larger firms, which is found unambiguously in our regression results for both sub-
periods.  
With regard to the macroeconomic and regulatory control variables, we have found that the 
real rate of interest in Sweden had a significantly positive effect on firm growth in the Swedish life 
insurance industry over the entire period and in each of the two sub-periods. However, real GDP had 
only a weak positive effect on the growth rates of life insurers. We have also found that the regulatory 
environment had an effect on insurers’ growth rates, with compelling evidence that the tighter financial 
regulation and control imposed by the Insurance Act 1903 had the effect of impeding the growth rates 
of our sample of Swedish life insurance companies. 
In conclusion, we  believe that there is scope for more historical economic research into the 
determinants of the growth of firms operating in international insurance markets and other sectors of 
financial services (e.g., banking). An investigation into the effects on the growth of small and large firms 
of changes in macro-economic and regulatory conditions is well overdue. An historical economic study 
of the effects of cost inefficiency arising from technical, allocative and scale inefficiencies in financial 
firms would also make a potentially valuable contribution to the literature. 
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